Rope-a-Dope

Good morning! Who’s ready to head back into the fire? As far as injuries, KP is probable, while Sam Houser is doubtful. We have a 7pm start time on TNT. Come say hi at at halftime.

One more quick note for anyone interested in free stuff: Fanatics is doing a giveaway special for KFS subscribers. Check the graphic below for how to enter. Winner announced tomorrow.

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Rope-a-Dope

51 years ago - 10 years after he shook up the world the first time - Muhammad Ali shocked the world again.

No longer the brash up and comer he once was and facing off against the best young boxer the sport had seen since, well…Ali himself, the self-proclaimed GOAT won a match in the only way he saw possible:

By losing.

Knowing that he didn’t stand a chance against 25-year-old George Foreman if he approached the match in any traditional sense, Ali devised a plan. He would permit Forman to beat the shit out of him, but only on his terms - against the ropes, and with his guard up the entire time.

It worked, and more than half a century later, the rope-a-dope lives on, not only as part of Ali’s legend, but as a convenient shorthand for any instance where an overmatched opponent uses their aggressor’s greatest strength against them.

Which brings us to Monday night. Much like Big George made a name for himself with unmatched, overwhelming power, the Celtics bludgeon opponents to death with the most potent weapon the league allows. Boston’s offense doesn’t just shoot threes, they hunt them. Every single move they make on the basketball court is executed with one purpose in mind: getting a good look behind the arc.

At first glance, they accomplished their mission on Monday, and the ultimate outcome was the result of bad luck more than anything else. According to NBA.com, the Celtics attempted 24 wide open threes, which the league defines as a shot where the closest defender is at least six feet away. They made just seven of those attempts for a conversion rate of 29.2 percent, which is a far cry from their regular season hit rate of 40.7 percent. On open threes (where the closest defender is between four and six feet away), Boston was even worse, hitting 7-of-32 attempts, or 21.9 percent. In the regular season, that number was 35.0 percent.

But tracking data is imperfect. Not only is it susceptible to human error (I challenge anyone to find anything remotely close to 56 threes with a defender at least four feet away), but it fails to take into account whether those shots come in rhythm and within the flow of the offense. Most importantly, it doesn’t factor in the types of threes taken, and how those shots were generated.